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JURISDICTION

This ease is within the jurisdiction of this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3)(j) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUE

Whether the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's $250,000 limitation on non-

economic damages (raised to S400,000 in 2001) recoverable in a medical malpractice
action, Utah Code Ann. § 7S-14-7.1 (1990 & Stipp. 2001), violates various provisions of
the Utah Constitution. Specifically,
1.

Does the Act's limitation on non-economic damages violate the Utah

Constitution's open courts guarantee, article I, section 1I?
2.

Docs the Act's limitation on non-economic damages violate the Utah

Constitution's uniform operation of laws clause, article I, section 24?
3.

Does the Act's limitation on non-economic damages violate the Utah

Constitution's guarantee of the right to a jury trial, article I, section 10?
4.

Does the Act's limitation on non-economic damages violate the Utah

Constitution's due process guarantee, article I, section 7, and can this argument now be
raised by plaintiff even though it was not preserved below?
5.

Does the Act's limitation on non-economic damages violate the Utah

Constitution's separation-of-powers provision, article V, section 1. and can this argument
now be raised by plaintiff even though it was not preserved below?
STANDARD OF REVIEW

The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which the court
independently reviews for correctness. See Parks v. Utah Transit Auth.. 2002 LT 55, f 4,
449 Utah Adv. Rep. 12.

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

Utah Constitution, article I, sections 7, 10, II and 25, and article V, section 1; and
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court
Below.

The court found that Dr. Gregory Drezga was negligent in his treatment of

plaintiff (R. 800 at 761), and the jury returned a $2,272,735.30 damage verdict. (R. 360.)
Non-economic damages made up SI,250,000 of the total. (R. 360.) Accordingly, Dr.
Drezga moved to reduce damages pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1, which caps
recoverable non-economic damages at $250,000.. (R. 364-69.) Plaintiff argued that the
cap violated various provisions of the Utah Constitution. (R. 447-74.)

After briefing and a hearing (R. 810), the court ruled for defendant and reduced
the general damage award to the $250,000 maximum then allowed by stale law, and

enteredjudgment for plaintiff in the amount of S1,181,829.40 plus costs and interest. (R.
782-88.)

Plaintiff appealed. (R. 792-94.)
B.

Statement of (he Facts.

While defendant docs not agree with the plaintiffs characterization of the

evidence, the facts are not determinative of this appeal and therefore defendant accedes
generally to the facts as presented by the plaintiff. (See App. Br. at 4-7.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Utah's statutory cap of $250,000 (now $400,000) on non-economic damages in
medical malpractice actions, enacted in 1986 as an amendment to the Health Care

Malpractice Act (the "Act"), is constitutional. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-7.1. Plaintiff

attacks the statute through various constitutional provisions, requesting under each that

2\<M-i2.10

this court apply a heightened standard of scrutiny to the statute and take a skeptical view
of both the empirical facts the legislature thought warranted this legislation and the
appropriateness of the means the legislature used to accomplish its ends. Defendant's
response is two-fold.

first, the present statute is one to which the heightened scrutiny standard should

not be applied. It is appropriate for this court, in deciding the level of scrutiny to apply to
the cap, to view it in the broader context of the statutory scheme of which it is a part. The
restriction on the remedy available to a plaintiff is mild, and is more than balanced by the
benefits to the class of which potential plaintiffs are members.
The Act, Utah Code Ann. ^ 78-14-1 et seep, was first passed in 1976 and has
been amended several times since, including in 1986 when the cap on non-economic
damages was added. The Act is designed to assure that medical services are available to
the members of the public, some of whom will be malpractice victims, at a reasonable
cost. The Act is also designed to assure that insurance is available to health care
providers to cover losses that may be suffered by some members of the public as a result
of malpractice. Choosing where to strike the balance between the interests of the public
in affordable, insured health care, and the interests of particular members of that public in

not having their tort rights against health care providers restricted in any manner, is a
matter of judgment, 'fhe legislature is given that charge by the constitution, and its
judgment should be given deference.

Second, even if a heightened standard were to be applied to the cap alone, and the
rest of the Act not considered, the current statute is distinguishable from those challenged

and struck down in the cases upon which plaintiff relies. The statute is more analogous
to those that have survived scrutiny. The cap is narrow in its application and mild in its

limit on non-economic damages, and it permits complete recovery of non-economic and

punitive damages. Additionally, the empirical justifications for the cap are much stronger
than those offered for provisions the court has found faulty in the past. Not only did the

1986 legislature have a reasonable basis to believe that a cap on non-economic damages
would serve to keep Utah's medical malpractice insurance rates within reach of more
health care providers, but recent studies on a national and local level have shown that this

type of cap actually has had the anticipated effect.
Nationwide, medical malpractice insurance is becoming less available and, if

available, is priced out of the reach of many providers. The causes for this situation may
be complex, but undeniably, one cause is the rapid increase in the level of awards for
non-economic damages and the unpredictability of such awards. In this climate, it would
be inappropriate for this court to substitute its judgment as to the reasonableness of the

balance struck by the legislature between the interests of individual plaintiffs in

recovering unlimited "soft" damages and the interests of the Utah public in having
insured medical services readily and affordably available. This court should follow the

majority of courts across the country and hold that the cap on non-economic damages is
constitutional.
ARGUMENT

I.

THE STATUTORY CEILING ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES
AND ITS HISTORY.

Utah's non-economic damages "cap" on medical malpractice claims was enacted

in 1986 and, at the time relevant to this appeal, read as follows:

As of 1997, twenty-three states had statutory limitations on tort damages for pain and
suffering, including sixteen states that have limited awards specifically in medical
malpractice eases. See Heidi Li Feldman, W. Page Kecton Symposium on Tort Law:
Harm and Money: A.uainst the Insurance Theory of Tort Compensation. 75 Tex. L. Rev

1567, 1567-68 (1997). The article only cites to four states in which a statutory-damage
limitation on non-economic damages was found unconstitutional. See id. at n. 4.

In a malpractice action against a health care provider, an
injured plaintiff may recover non-economic losses to
compensate for pain, suffering, and inconvenience. In no
case shall the amount 01 damages awarded for such noneconomic loss exceed $250,000.

This limitation does not

affect awards of punitive damages.

Utah Code Ann. §78-14-7.1.2 When enacted, it was made part of the original 1976
Ilealth Care Malpractice Act. "with the intent that the findings and purpose statement of
the . . . Act would apply to the . . . cap.""' Because the cap was enacted after the initial

legislation, however, § 78-14-7.1 also has its own legislative history. That historv
demonstrates that the purpose of the non-economic damage ceiling, like the original Act,
is to keep down malpractice insurance rates within Utah in order to ensure the availability
and atfordability of insurance coverage for health care providers. Empirical studies on a

national and local level show that the damage cap has had the effect anticipated by the
legislature.
A.

History of the 1976 Health Care Malpractice Act

The legislative findings of the 1976 Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act") have
been summarized as follows:

The Act takes specific note of the continually increasing
number of malpractice claims and actions being brought as
well as the continuing escalation in the amounts received in
settlements and from judgments. It recognizes that these
trends are costly and affect the health care provider through
higher insurance premiums, the cost of which is passed on to
the patient through more expensive health care. The Act also
refers to the often overlooked effect of the practice of
defensive medicine and to the loss of patient services from
health care providers who are discouraged from practice

" In 2001, the limit was increased to $400,000, with annual adjustments for inflation
thereafter.

James E. Magleby, The Constitutionality of Utah's Medical Malpractice Damages Cap
Under the Utah Constitution. 21 J. Conternp. L. 217, 247(1995).

because of the high cost and possible unavailability of
malpractice insurance.

In enacting both the Act and later the cap on non-economic damages, the

legislature adopted the position taken by the Governor's Report' which "disapproved the
'crisis type' legislation enacted in other states and recommended . . . only simple,

relatively non-controversial legislation."6 In 1976, this consisted of two principal
methods to protect the public interest. One was to establish "a mechanism to ensure the
availability of insurance in the event that it bee[a]me unavailable from private

companies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. This was accomplished by giving the insurance
commissioner provisional authority to implement a joint underwriting effort involving all
insurers if liability insurance coverage became unavailable in the voluntary market. See
icLatg 78-14-9.

The second approach adopted in 1976 to protect the public interest was to enact
provisions "designed to encourage private insurance companies to provide health-related
malpractice insurance." LL at § 78-14-2. These measures included shortening and
tightening the statute of limitations for malpractice actions, clarifying the doctrine of
informed consent, and establishing procedures for prosecuting malpractice suits. The

1976 Act also included a requirement that the complaint contain a prayer for reasonable
damages, not a specific dollar amount, and that the plaintiff give the defendant a ninetyday notice of intent to sue.

While these initial measures resulted in a period of relative stability in malpractice
insurance rates, rates again begin to rise dramatically in the early 1980's, prompting the

Comment, Developments in Utah Law-Medical Malpractice, 1976 Utah U. Rev. 47j,
476(1976).

5Report of the Governor's Malpractice Evaluation Committee, State of Utah (Nov. 28,
1975) ("Governor's Report").

° Developments in Utah Law, supra, 1976 1hah I . Rev. at 477 (citing Governor's
Report).

legislature to take further steps. In 19S5, the legislature added provisions requiring a
prelitigation panel hearing for all medical malpractice actions, limiting to one-third the
percentage of any award that a contingent fee attorney could receive, and allowing the
amount of awarded damages to be decreased by collateral resources. See Utah Code

Ann. ij§ 78-14-4.5,-7.5, &-12. This was followed in 1986 by a provision allowing
periodic payments of future damages, and the cap of $250,000 on pain and suffering
damages which is at issue here. See jd. at §cj 78-14-7.1 & 9.5.
B.

History and Impact of the 1986 Non-Economic Damages
Ceiling.

The legislature enacted post-1 976 provisions, including the statutory cap for non-

economic damages, in response to evidence that the original Act did not sufficiently
arrest the growth in frequency and severity of malpractice claims. As one Utah
commentator wrote in 1984, before the passage of the cap on non-economic damages.
The Malpractice Act's inadequacy is further demonstrated by
the experience of Utah hospitals. From 1978 to 1983 the
average resolution and payment costs for claims that were
settled by hospitals rose from about $8,000 to almost S44.000
per claim. Costs rose fastest in the latter years of that period
when the average costs in 1981 and 3983 increased
approximately 180 percent. These figures dramatically show
that malpractice claim resolution and patient compensation
become more expensive every year. The hospitals also report
a growth in the number of claims asserted. About thirty-five
percent more claims were asserted in 1983 than in 1978.
although over that same period the amount of service
provided by hospitals only increased ten percent. These
figures indicate an increase in the frequency with which
claims are asserted.

The amicus brief filed by Intermountain Health Care, Inc.; UHA, Utah Hospitals
and Health Systems Association: and Utah Medical Association ("Health Care Amicus
Comment, Medical Malpractice Legislation: RTor Utah. 11 J. Contemp. L. 2S7, 293294 (1984) (citations omitted).

::v4-i: y

Brief), details the rise in the early 1980s of the number and the dollar value of medical

malpractice claims in Utah and the resulting increase in medical malpractice insurance
rates. From 1982 to 1985 the average amount paid per malpractice claim increased 54
percent and from 1979 to 1985 the total compensation paid by malpractice insurers
increased at an annual rate of 25 percent. See Health Care Amicus Brief at pp. 20-23.
Utah insurance companies responded by dramatically raising their rates: St. Paul
Insurance Co. increased its rates by 25 to 35 percent annually from 1984-86; UMIA
increased its rates from 15 to 67 percent annually from 1982-86; and Aetna increased its
rates by 20 to 50 percent annually from 1980-82 and, faced with losses, discontinued
writing malpractice insurance in 1983. The growth in the cost of insurance had the effect

of limiting the availability of affordable health care because the costs are passed on to
consumers. Ceilings on non-economic damages were seen as an efficacious means of
keeping malpractice rates from rising too fast.

When the Utah legislature enacted the non-economic damage ceiling in 1986, it
was clear from other states' experiences that non-economic damage ceilings had the
prospect of curbing the growth in costs for liability insurance and health care.
Subsequent studies across the country have confirmed the reasonableness of the

"In support of the [damage cap], it was argued that the passage of the bill would result
in a 20 percent reduction in medical malpractice insurance rates, which were blamed for
costing the consumer an additional $45 a day during a hospital stay." Magleby, supra, 21
J. Contcmp. L. at 25 1 (citing Representatives Holt and Barlow, Floor Debate, Utah House
of Representatives, February 12, 1986).
Specifically, California's ceiling on non-economic damages, which became effective in
1975, became a model for other states after it was held to be constitutional by the
California Supreme Court. See Fein v. Permancnte Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 157164 (Cal. 1985). Thomas W. Farrell, Virginia's Medical Malpractice Cap and the
Doctrine of Substantive Due Process, Tort & Ins.. L.J. 684, 688 (1988) (noting that
fourteen states had passed damage caps which limited recovery in medical malpractice
actions by 1986).

:i(w4: :•.>

legislature's judgment as to the relationship between such a ceiling and the objective of

slowing the rise in health care costs. As one commentator observed:

The weight of empirical evidence suggests that . . . some
of the legal reforms had the intended effect of stabilizing
liability insurance markets and reducing the overall level
of medical malpractice payments. The largest reductions
in payments and premiums were attributable to a few
provisions, notably caps on awards and modifications of
the collateral source rule ....''

In 1995, acting at the request of the United States Congress, its Office of Technology

Assessment issued a report confirming that "caps on damage awards were the only tvpe
of State tort reform that consistently showed significant results in reducing the

malpractice cost indicators." (Emphasis added.)

A review of Utah's medical malpractice rates since the passage of the cap on noneconomic damages confirms the legislature's judgment. The cap has had its intended
effect in holding medical malpractice rates relatively stable. See Health Care Amicus
Brief at pp. 25-26 (citing the Tillinghast Report of Actuarian Study Commissioned by
UMIA, UMA, and IHC, August S, 1994). In Utah, UMIA's medical malpractice

insurance rates decreased by 17 percent from 1986 to 1994. See id. at 25 (citing
Tillinghast Report at 18-19). UMIA's loss ratio, which is the percentage of the

malpractice premiums which are paid toward malpractice claims, decreased from a six-

10 Bovbjerg & Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and Evidence. 67 U. Cin. L.
Rev. 53, 62 (1998) (italics added). For empirical evidence on the impact of tort reforms.
See Dan/on, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims. 27 J.L. &
Leon. 115 (19S4); Hamilton, Rabinowit/.. & Alschuler, Inc., Claim Evaluation Project
(1987): Dan/on, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: NewEvidence. 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 57 (1986); Sloan et aL, Effects of Tort Reforms on
the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice Claims: A Microanalysis. 14 J. Health Pol.
Pofy&L. 663(1989).

11 U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Impact of Legal Reforms on

Medical Malpractice Costs, OTA-BP-H-119, p. 64 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Gov't
Printing Office. October 1993).

year average of 157 percent before the damage cap to a six-year average of 66 percent
after the cap. See id. Utah's percentage of loss payments of the nation's total declined
from a six-year average of 0.6 before the cap to a six-year average of 0.4 after the cap,
even though Utah's percentage of physicians increased during the period from 0.6 to 0.7
percent of the nation's total. See id.
In sum, addition of the cap on non-economic damages to the 1976 Act has had
precisely the desired effect: insurance rates have not risen in Utah dramatically and
coverage has remained available. In the context of the current nationwide medical

malpractice insurance crunch, " this court should not substitute its judgment for the
legislature's as to the reasonableness of a statute that has successfully achieved its desired

and legitimate result.1"1
II.

APPELLANTS' VARIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
THE CEILING ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES ARE ALL
FOUNDED ON ESSENTIALLY THE SAME PREMISES AND SEEK
THE APPLICATION OF THE SAME NON-DEFERENTIAL
STANDARD.

A.

Heightened and Deferential Approaches to Statutes Challenged
as Unconstitutional.

12

In response to the nationwide health care crisis, President George W. Bush has called

for, among other things, federal legislation capping non-economic damages at $250,000
in medical malpractice actions. See, e.g., Mike Allen and Amy Goldstein, Bush Urges
Malpractice Damage Limits, Washington Post, July 26, 2002, at A04.
See Health Care Amicus Brief at pp. 26-30 (detailing, among other things, the health
care crisis in Nevada which drove physicians out of state or into retirement and caused
the largest trauma center in the state to close). On August 1, 2002, in reaction to the
health care crisis, the Nevada legislature passed medical malpractice reform which,
among other things, capped non-economic damages at 5350,000. See A. B. 1, 2002
Legislative Session, 18th Special Session (Neveda 2002). The bill was signed by the
governor on August 7, 2002 and it appears to have had immediate effect. See Joelle
Babula, Medical Crisis.- Obstetric Patients Find Relief Las Vega Review-Journal,

August 9, 2002, at IA (noting that after a three month hiatus, many doctors opened their
doors to new patients after the damage cap was passed and one insurance company has
promised to lower premiums).

:i'M4::<j
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Courts, both state and federal, have long been inclined to review constitutional
challenges to legislation with one of two attitudes. The first is deferential to the
legislature and accords its enactments an operative presumption of constitutionality. The

second is skeptical of legislative action and closely scrutinizes the means chosen by the
legislature and its ability to achieve the legislative ends, the legitimacy of the ends to be
accomplished, and the narrowness of the mechanism selected to achieve the ends. These
two approaches are discussed here in broad terms as a prelude to addressing each of the

plaintiffs constitutional arguments because both the deferential and the heightened
scrutiny approach to reviewing legislative enactments appear in the Utah case law
pertaining to most of the provisions upon which plaintiff relies.
L'tah ease law indicates that the level of scrutiny appropriate to a particular piece

of legislation—strict or deferential—under one of the constitutional provisions relied

upon by plaintiff is also generally appropriate under the others. See, e^g., Condemarin v.
University Hosp., 775 P.2d 348, 356-60 (L'tah 1989) (recognizing that the overlap

between the equal protection analysis and due process analysis is "'considerable" and that

the open courts provision is an '"extension" of due process). Similarly, if a piece of
legislation can withstand the applicable analysis under one provision, it likely will
wi thstand

that same scrutiny under another provision.

For these reasons, it makes sense

to consider the facts relevant to these two approaches generically, and to address their

overall similarities before addressing each under the various constitutional provisions.

Plaintiff argues for a heightened standard of scrutiny under each of five
constitutional provisions and contends that the $250,000 cap on non-economic damages

14 See, e.g.. Parks, 2002 LT 55 at *;i8 (not applying "heightened'' scrutiny and summarily
holding damage cap constitutional under article 1, sections 7, 10, 24 of the Utah
Constitution^McCorvcy v. Utah State DepT of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 4S (Utah 1993)
(summarily holding damage cap constitutional under article I, sections 7, 10. 11. and 24
of the Utah Constitution).
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in medical malpractice cases cannot withstand that level of scrutiny. Although plaintiff
addresses the statute under a separate analytical model for each constitutional provision,
the decisions relied upon under each are largely the same, ~because when the court has
struck down a statute, the court members have seldom found that the particular

constitutional provision under which the statute was analyzed made a difference in the

result.10 The standard of scrutiny seems to be the primary determinant of the validity of a
statute. If a deferential standard is applied, the statute will be upheld. If a heightened

standard is applied, the statute may be upheld, but has a fair chance of being struck
down.

LS (Sce^e^, App. Br. 12-18, 25-26, 28-30, 35-36, 39, 14, 44-45 (plaintiff cites
Condemarin in each of his i'wc argument sections to support the claim that the damage
cap is unconstitutional under article I, sections 7, 10, II, and 24, and article V, section 1
of the Utah Constitution).)

1(> SeCi e_._£., Cojidemarin, 775 P.2d 348 (while all applying a level of "heightened"
scrutiny to find the statute unconstitutional, Justice Durham struck it under article I,
sections 7, 10, 11, and 24; Justice Zimmerman under article L sections 7 and 11; and
Justice Stewart under article I, section 24); Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 589-90 (Utah
1993) (applying a heightened standard of review, three members of the court struck down

the statute under uniform operation of the law provision while the remaining two found it
invalid under the open courts provision); sec also, supra at fn. 14.

1' Although the strict scrutiny and deferential standards are worded as though they were
polar opposites, occasionally this court has expressly recognized that middle ground
exists between the two diehotomous approaches to analyzing challenged statutes, a
middle ground that avoids leading the court into an analytical "straightjacket." See
Condemarin at 366-67 (per Zimmerman, J.) (noting that the court avoided being bound
by the rigid application of the strict and loose approaches to the Utah Constitution's
tiniform-operation-of-the-law provision and that it could likewise avoid that rigidity in
analyzing Utah constitutional open courts provision). Such a review may be more
scrupulous than under the "rational basis" test, yet not so exacting as is required under the
"strict scrutiny'' test. See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City, Corp, 752 P.2d
884, 888-90 (Utah 1988). See also Condemarin. 775 P.2d at 357-59 (per Durham, J.)
(stating that "a number of courts have incorporated an intermediate or realistic level of
scrutiny into their equal protection framework in order to achieve the flexibility needed to
balance state interests against individual rights"). There are few Utah cases that actually
say that they are applying this approach.
However, several of this court's recent decisions applying the "open courts"
provision of the Utah Constitution, article I, section 11, evidence this more middling

12

B. Utah Case Law Addressing Tort Limiting Legislation.

When addressing the damage cap, it is important to recognize the larger pattern of

which it is a part. For 25 years the Utah legislature has attempted to cabin the exposure
of various parts of the economy to tort actions in direct response to a notable judicial
expansion of the reach of tort theories and to the increased willingness of juries to award
large amounts of damages. As a consequence of these judicial developments, the

legislature concluded that certain areas of the economy have been severely impacted,
with consequences for both the industries and the public they serve, including increased
costs and decreased availability of services. Some of the areas the legislature has
addressed include: governmental entities and employees,

dram shops, pharmaceutical

manufacturers,2" participants in the construction industry, the ski industry," and health
care providers." The Utah legislature has enacted various mechanisms in its attempts to

contain liability exposure, including statutes of repose," shortened statutes of

limitation/'" prelitigation panels.2" ceilings on total damages,"' ceilings on non-economic
approach. See, e.g.. Craftsman Builder's Supply. Inc. v. Butler Manufacturing Co., 1999
UT 18.«;f 16-23, 974 P.2d 1194 (holding that the builders'statute of repose did not
violate the open courts clause of the Utah Constitution and was justified by the
legislature's findings of undue economic and other burdens); Lyon v. Burton. 2000 UT
19;V S2-S3 5 P.3d616 (Howe. J., concurring) (finding that the S250.000 immunity cap
was a "reasonable substitution" and that the legislature should be "accorded broad

discretion in providing an alternative remedy"). See also Hirpa v. IHC Hosp.. Inc.. 948
P.2d 785, 792-94 (Utah 1997) (recognizing that individual's rights "must be balanced
against the legislature's need to enact laws to meet changing societal needs" and holding
that Utah's Good Samaritan Act does not violate Utah's open courts provision because it
was justified by the greater protection injured persons would receive).

'" See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-3 & -4.
14 Sec icL at § 32A-14-102(6).
:,J SceuL at $ 7S-1S-2.
21 See id at § 78-12-21.5.
::SeeicLat§§ 78-27-51 &-53.
23 Seeiiat §§78-14-1 et seep
:4 See id at $ 78-12-21.5(4).
25 See id at $S 78-14-4 (1) and § 78-12-21.5 (3)(b).
:i-u::.
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damages,28 heightened standards for punitive damages,"' damages sharing with the
state,30 and various alternative remedies, such as substituting governmental liability for
employees liability and then capping the governmental liability.J
Litigants have challenged a number of these mechanisms as unconstitutional.
Invariably, a contention is made that the legislation has impaired some individual right,
warranting application of the heightened standard of scrutiny, which is often a predictor

of invalidity. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 357 (per Durham, J.) (noting that "the
selection of the standard of review virtually determines the outcome" under an equal

protection analysis). While attacks on these legislative efforts have included all the
provisions relied upon by plaintiff, the most successful have been made under article I,
section 11, the open courts provision.

Prior to 1985, the open courts provision had been largely dormant. But with the
decision in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), which struck down
a statute of repose in the Utah Products Liability Act, the open courts provision became
among the most favored vehicles for attacks on tort-limiting measures in Utah. The court

in Berry held that the open courts provision gives substantive protection for the tort rights
of individuals and adopted a two-pronged test to protect those rights. If the first prong is
not satisfied, the enactment qualifies for heightened scrutiny. All the Berry court
required for an enactment to run afoul of the first prong is a showing that the provision in
question has imposed a new restriction on a then-preexisting right of some individual to
sue or to recover damages for a tort. Sec id. at 680.
Pour members of the court decided Berry without dissent. Over time, however,

2°Seeiiat§§ 78-14-12 (2)(a).
27 See id at § 63-30-34.
28 Sec id at §§ 78-14-12 (2)(a).
2''See id at§ 78-18-2.
30 See id at § 78-18-1 (3).
" See id at § 63-30-4(4) & -34.
14

there has been a growing disharmony among members of the court when addressing
challenges to legislative efforts to cabin tort exposure. At times, the dispute has
concerned which constitutional provision should be relied upon; at others, the analytical

model to apply under a provision, particularly under the open courts provision; and at still
others, whether a heightened or deferential approach should be taken, finally, there have
been disputes as to whether a particular legislative measure withstands challenge under

the standard in question/2 Over the course of the years, similar mechanisms have met
different fates.""5

This dissention persists today. As recently as August 2002. the court split 3 to 2
over whether Berry itself should be overruled. In Lancy v. Eairview City, 2002 UT 79

(August 6. 2002), the majority struck down the legislature's attempt to extend
governmental immunity to a proprietary function— the generation and distribution oi'
electricity. The two dissenters argued that Berry's imposition of stiff substantive hurdles
to any legislative limitation of tort rights has distorted the relationship between the

legislature and the courts by giving this court the right to decide when and how the

legislature may modify prior tort common law. Sec at Yi 89-93 (Wilkins. J., concurring
and dissenting, joined by Durrant, A.C.J.). The dissent would find article I. section 11 to

": Sec, e\g. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 369-70 (per Stewart, J.) (rejecting Justice Durham's
and Justice Zimmerman's application of the open courts provision and due process and
analyzing the statute under the equal protection clause) (dissenting. Hall, C.J.) (rejects
majority departure from rational basis standard of review); Lyon, 2000 UT 19 (Justices
Stewart and Durham found that the statute violated the Berry test; Chief Justice Howe

and Justice Russon found the first prong of Berry is met and thus did not proceed to the

heightened standard of the second prong; and Justice Zimmerman rejected the application
of Berry altogether); Craftsman. 1999 UT IS at «fi 32-155.
?- Compare Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, inc. v. Herm Hughes & Son. Inc.. 782 P.2d

188 (Utah 1989) and Ilorton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989)
(striking down builder's statute of repose) with Craftsman, 1999 UT 18 (upholding
similar statute of repose) and Parks. 2002 UT 55 at 1|19 (substituting capped state remedy
for unlimited remedy against state employee) and Lyon with Condermarin. 775 P.2d 35066 (per. Durham, J.) (onejudge would strike down nearly identical provision).

protect procedural interests only, and would retreat entirely from Berry's two prong test.
See id. That position has been echoed by the Attorney General in its amicus brief
supporting the defendant in this case. (See State of Utah Amicus Brief at pp. 5, 14, 17,
24-26.)

Over the past twenty years of this court's decisions addressing tort-limiting
legislation, there are two disccrnablc trends relevant to the present case, first, the court

has tended to defer to legislative enactments to limit liability for governmental entities
and employees performing governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. This is
reflected in the court's decisions upholding the cap on total damages for governmental

entities performing traditional governmental functions."1
The second apparent trend is that when reviewing tort-limiting legislation

applicable to private parties or governments performing non-governmental functions, the
court recently appears to have taken a less skeptical approach to legislative justifications
for enactments than it did in the years immediately following Berry. See, e.g., Hirpa, 948

34 See McCorvcy v. Utah State Dep't ofTransp., 868 P.2d 41, 48 (Utah 1993) (holding
damage cap constitutional under article 1, sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 for injuries arising
from negligence in the performance of governmental functions); Bott v. DeLand, 922
P.2d 732, 743 (Utah 1996) (noting that the damage cap is constitutional under article I,
sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 as applied to judgments for injuries from performance of
governmental functions). The only damage cap pertaining to a governmental entity that
has been struck down was a cap for total damages that was very low ($100,000) and
applied solely to the University of Utah Hospital. See Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366. Yet
that ease involved a governmental entity that was performing essentially proprietary
functions. See Parks, 2002 UT 55 at fl 11-13; Laney, 2002 UT 79 at fl 74-83 (Russon,
J., concurring) (finding that Parview city's operation of a power plant was proprietary
and thus was not subject to immunity under the statute). Moreover, that decision was by
a very divided court and has since been distinguished as having "limited precedential
value" because it did not involve an entity acting in a governmental capacity. Id. at *\ 11.
But see Day v. State, 1999 UT 46, 980 P.2d 1171 (The court, relying on Berry, struck

down a short-lived and by then repealed statute immunizing government employees
driving emergency vehicles negligently. Because the legislature had already repealed the
statute, and because a total cap on damages from such conduct was upheld in Lyon, it is
hard to tell what enduring proposition, if any, Day stands for.).
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P.2d at 793-94; Lyon, 2000 UT 19 at f S3 (Howe. C.J., eoncurring);and Parks, 2002 UT

55 at • 8. For example, this court recently upheld as satisfying the second prong of Berry
a lengthened version of a statute of repose that had been struck down earlier. In the more
recent case, the court found that the statute of repose reasonably eliminated a clear social

or economic evil, even though legislative justifications for the statute were largely

indistinguishable from those found inadequate in the earlier cases. Compare Sun Valley
Water Beds. 782 P.2d at 192-94 and Horton, 785 P.2d at 1094-95 yyjth Craftsman. 1999

UT 18 at*'" 18-23. In addition, the majority of the court no longer appears compelled to
search outside the legislative record for data that contradicts legislative facts found to
support a given statute. Compare Berry, 717 P.2d at 681-83 and Lee. 867 P.2d at 583-89
with Craftsman, 1999 UT 18 at *ftlS-23 (looking only at legislative objectives and

requiring the party challenging the statute to submit evidence that the objectives were not
met); see also Hirpa. 948 P.2d at 793-94.

The court's recent decision in Laney v. Fairview City. 2002 UT 79, is consistent
with this observation. There, the court refused to permit the legislature to cloak with

governmental immunity the proprietary function of generating, transporting, and selling
electricity for profit. The lead opinion for two members of the court reasoned that the
legislative justification for the immunity was very general, that the scope of immunity
granted was very broad, and that there was little to link the particular activity under

scrutiny with the supposed justification for the immunity. See kL at *\*\. 66-71. This
reasoning is consistent with a de facto more deferential approach to article I. section 11.
fhe two dissenters would overrule Berry, while Justice Russon. who joined in the result,

would hold that the legislature may not under any circumstances extend governmental

immunity to non-traditional proprietary governmental functions. See id. at "j 74-S3
(Russon. J., concurring), and \ 85 (Wilkins. J., concurring and dissenting). Given the

split in the court, and the divergent reasoning of the majority, I.ancy cannot be said to
demonstrate the court's return to the very skeptical approach toward legislative action and

justifications that was evidenced by Berry, Lee, Morton and Sun Valley Water Beds.
The court should consider plaintiff's challenge to the cap on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice cases against this backdrop. Analysis under a proper
interpretation of Berry's first prong will show that the present statute is one to which the
heightened scrutiny standard should not be applied. But if a heightened standard were

applied, the current statute is distinguishable from those challenged and struck down in
the cases appellant relies upon and is more analogous to those statutes that have survived
scrutiny.
III.

THE STATUTORY CEILING ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE

OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
ARTICLE I, SECTION II.

Appellant's primary challenge to the ceiling on non-economic damages in medical

malpractice cases is under the open courts provision, article I, section 11A The critical
standard for determining whether legislation runs afoul of article I, section 11 is Berry's
two pronged test:
First, section 11 is satisfied if the law provides an injured
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy "by
due course of law"

for vindication

of his

constitutional

interest. The benefit provided by the substitute must be
substantially equal in value or other benefit to the remedy
abrogated in providing essentially comparable substantive
protection to one's person, property, or reputation, although
the form of the substitute remedy may be different. . . .

?o

Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides in relevant part that "[a]ll courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person, property or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered without

denial or unnecessary delay . . . ."

Second, if there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be
justified only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be
eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is
not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the
objective.
"17P.2dat6S0.

Plaintiff contends that the non-economic damages cap of S250.000 restricts or
abrogates a person's fundamental right to recover non-economic damages and does not
provide "an effective and reasonable alternative remedy . . . for vindication of his
constitutional interest" in such recovery. (See App. Br. at 18-19.) This, he contends, is

enough to assure that the cap cannot pass the first prong of the Berry test and will
therefore be subject to heightened scrutiny. As for the second prong, plaintiff argues that
the cap must fail that review because the restriction on the appellant's right to recover
non-economic damages is not justified by the need to address a "clear social or economic
evil." See id.

Defendant asserts that the cap can pass the first Berry test, if that test is construed

in a manner consistent with the case upon which Berry grounded its substantive reading
of article I. section 11. Masich v. United States Smelting. Refining & Mining Co.. 191

P.2d 612 (Utah 1948), appeal dismissed, 325 U.S. 866 (1948). Alternatively, defendant
contends that even if the cap and the Act of which it is a part cannot pass the first Berry

test and the analysis required by the second prong is performed, the court should uphold
the non-economic damage cap.

A.

The Statutory Ceiling on Non-Economic Damages Provides an
Effective and Reasonable Alternative Remedy that Satisfies the
First Prong of Berrv.

The first question under Berry is whether a statute abrogates or diminishes an
important tort right without providing a substantially equivalent alternate remedy. If it
does not. the court need not address Berry's second prong. In applying the first prong of
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Berry, a majority of this court has not looked at tort- limiting statutes in the larger context
of the statutory scheme of which they may be a part. Rather, the court has focused on

whether a particular plaintiff has had his or her tort rights diminished or abrogated by a
particular provision within a larger statutory scheme. If so, the first prong of Berry has

not been satisfied and the statute is then analyzed under the second prong/' The result is
a very low operative threshold for the application of heightened scrutiny to legislative
enactments, which is a prime reason that Berry has been criticized by members of this

court as upsetting the appropriate relationship between the court and the legislature. See
fancy, 2002 UT 79 at lfl| 89-93 (Wilkins, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Lyon,
2000 UT 19 at 1|^| 85-92 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); and Craftsman, 1999
LIT 18 atfl 108-55 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result)); see also Day, 1999 U'f 46
at 1HJ 52-55 (Zimmerman, J., dissenting). It is also the basis for the Attorney General's
vigorous call to overrule Berry. See State of Utah Amicus Brief at pp. 5, 14, 17, 24-26.

When the court takes this narrow approach to analyzing components of a broad
statutory scheme, it is acting contrary to the very case upon which Berry and its progeny,

including Laney, rely for the legitimacy of their substantive approach to article I, section
11. That case is Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Alining Co., 191 P.2d

612."w If Masich were followed, the court would examine a legislative scheme in its
entirety in light of the whole class of persons it affects, not just by reference to any one
person who may have lost tort rights. The detriment to some class members that may

i(> t-

Sce, e.g., Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366 (per Durham, J.) (the majority found the
recovery limits of the Governmental Immunity Act unconstitutional as applied to the
University Hospital without looking at the Act as a whole); Lee, 867 P.2d at 589 (holding
that the limitations periods applicable to claims of minors under the Utah Health Care

Malpractice Act were unconstitutional without looking at the provisions within the scope
of the entire Act).

37 See Berry, 717 P.2d at 675-77, 679-80; Laney, 2002 UT 79 at fl 43-44; Craftsman,
1999 UT 18 at fl 64, 83-86 (Stewart, J., concurring).

2\'>441 2'i
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result from limitation or abrogation of tort rights would be considered in light of the
benetits to the entire class from the legislation. Furthermore, the court would give broad

deference to the legislature to determine the necessity for, and wisdom of, the trade-off

In Masich, the plaintiff attacked the constitutionality of the Utah Occupational
Disease Disability Law, 42 U.C.A. 1943, Ch. la (Utah Code Ann.jjij 34A-3-101 et seep).
as amended. Sec 191 P.2d at 623-25. That statute provided, among other things, that a

person who contracted silicosis on the job could not resort to the common law right to sue

the employer for the creation of the conditions producing the disease, but had as an

exclusive remedy the right to file a claim with the Industrial Commission. See id. at 614.
The statute further provided, however, that no amount could be paid upon a claim for
silicosis "unless total disability results within two years" from the date of last

employment. Id. The plaintiff had been an employee of the defendant mine and had
contracted silicosis, but he was not totally disabled and therefore did not fall within the

class of persons eligible for silicosis compensation under the act. See id. at 613. The

plaintiff asserted that the act violated article I, section 11 because it took from him his
common law right to sue for negligence and did not replace it with a right to
compensation. See id. at 623.

The court phrased the question before it in words that sound quite familiar under
the Berry line of cases: "The contention is made that if a partially disabled employee is

not granted compensation and, further, is denied his common law right to action then he
has been deprived of his remedy by due course of law for an injury done to his person,
contrary to" article I, section 11. Id. The court answered this question, however, quite

differently than the two-prong Berry test would suggest. By a four to one vote, the
Masich court held that while the plaintiffs common law remedies had been abrogated
and he could not recover for his injuries, under the alternative remedies available from

:442 2
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the Commission, article I, section 11 was not offended. See hi at 623-25. The court
reasoned that the act as a whole was designed to provide remedies for workers suffering

from job-related diseases as a class: 'The fact that under the act certain of the employees
are denied their common law right, and at the same time only given compensation on
reaching a stage of total disability, docs not offend against the Constitution as certain
individual rights and remedies can be made to yield to the public good." Id at 624.

"[TJhe act should not be discarded because some members of the class have rights, which
may be adversely affected." IcL

The dissenting justice would have found a way to construe the statute as

permitting a person who was ineligible for compensation under the act to retain their
common law rights. His contention was that such a construction is appropriate to avoid
denying the plaintiff an important common law right. See id, at 629-30 (Wade, J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, said that it was not for the court to privilege its view
over that of the legislature as to the wisdom of the trade-off made by the statute: 'This
court cannot ignore or strike down an act because it is either wise or unwise. The
wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the legislature to determine. If the act is unjust,

amendments to correct the inequities should be made by the legislature and not by
judicial interpretation." Id. at 625._1

",s It is noteworthy that the Utah Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether the
Workers Compensation Act, which also abolishes common law tort rights against
employers and substitutes a fixed compensation system, violates article I, section 11. Its
validity was assumed by the majority in Masich, despite the fact that there might not be a
remedy provided to each person whose common law tort rights are abrogated. See 717
P.2d at 680. If the current court were to use the first prong of Berry to examine the
situation of any particular worker who cannot recover under the Workers Compensation
Act but could have recovered under common law, the act would fail to pass constitutional
muster, for the legislature could have found a way to permit an equivalent right to recover
without frustrating the purpose of the entire act. And that is the threshold that Berry and
its progeny have imposed for constitutional validity.
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As written and applied, the first prong of the Berry test seems founded on the
dissent in Masich, not upon the majority. The Masich majority considered the impact of
the legislation on all those subject to it, and deferred to the legislature as to the wisdom of
trading some individuals" common law tort rights for benefits to the class as a whole. So
long as there was a trade-off, and the act did not simply abolish common law rights
without benefits to the class, article I. section 11 was not offended. See kL at 624.

In articulating and applying the Berry standard, this court appears never to have
explored in any detail the actual analysis and holding of Masich. See Berry, 717 P.2d at

675-77, 679-80. No opinion of the court has addressed whether Berry's first prong,
which focuses solely on an individual's loss of tort rights, is inconsistent with Masich's

focus on the broad effect of the legislative scheme on all those subject to it and with its
deference toward the legislature's right to balance benefits and detriments to individuals
who may be subjected to a statutory scheme. However, two members of the court in
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, although not citing Masich, did follow very closely its
approach.

hi Lyon, the statute in question immunized individual state employees from

negligence claims. See 2000 UT 19 at r 25. In place of the ability to recover unlimited
damages from an individual employee personally, the legislature substituted a waiver of
immunity so that a governmental entity could be sued for the employee's conduct.

Recovery against the state, however, was capped at a maximum of 5250,000 for all
damages suffered. See id. The plaintiff in Lyon, who had been struck and seriously
injured by an emergency vehicle, had his jury verdict substantially reduced by the cap.
See id. at M' 3, 8. Plaintiff argued before this court that the statute violated article 1,

section 11 because it took away the right to recover unlimited damages against an
individual and substituted a riszht to recover only $250,000. See kL at ' 25. The

IT,

defendant argued that under Masich, the limited remedy against the government was an
adequate substitute for the immunization of the individual employee. See id. at Yi 54, 63.
Justice Stewart, writing for himself and Justice Durham, asserted that the only
proper way to apply the first prong of Berry was to determine whether the substitute
remedy permitted an individual to recover the same amount of damages as the remedy
taken away; if it did not, then the challenged act could not pass that test. Because by
definition the cap could not satisfy this standard, Justice Stewart proceeded to apply the
heightened scrutiny of the second prong of Berry and would have held the statute
violative of article I, section 11. See id. at ^| 53-66. Justice Stewart rejected summarily
the assertion that under Masich, the substitute remedy could be found adequate. See icL
at 1| 63.

Chief Justice Howe, writing for himself and Justice Russon, applied Berry and
would have upheld the challenged substitution of remedies. See [d. at Y\ 82-83/
Although acknowledging that the cap did not permit a plaintiff to obtain an award of all
damages that might be incurred, Justice IIowe concluded that the first prong of Berry was
satisfied. Instead of asking whether a particular injured party might have their tort rights
limited by the cap, he asked whether the trade-off struck by the legislature in enacting the
cap was reasonable. Although he did not cite to Masich, his language reflects the

approach followed by the Masich majority. Lie said:
[TJhe legislature should be accorded broad discretion in
providing an alternative remedy. 1 believe that a $250,000
judgment against the state is an effective and reasonable
substitution for a possibly greater judgment against a state
employee. I say this because experience has shown that large
judgments against state employees for their negligence are

Because the fifth judge, Justice Zimmerman, joined in the result with Justices Howe

and Russon, although on grounds that Berry should be overruled, the result sought by
Justice Howe's opinion prevailed and the statute was upheld, despite its providing a less
than complete substitute remedy for the particular plaintiff
21<)442 :<)

often uncollectible. ... A plaintiff who recovers a judgment
against the state under our immunity act faces none of those
problems of collectibility. In my opinion, the substitution of
remedies is effective and reasonable.

Id. at c S3. ' Defendant here contends that the entire court should adopt Masich's class-

wide, deferential analytical approach under Berry's first prong when addressing any

statutory scheme challenged under article I, section 11. Such an approach would have
several advantages over the present narrow analysis required by the first prong of Berry.
First, because statutory schemes that balance detriments and benefits to the class

affected by the legislation would be evaluated as a whole, and because the legislature
would have the ability to strike balances among members of the class without being

micro-managed by this court, the threshold for invoking Berry's heightened scrutiny
analysis would become far less mechanistic and far more nuanced. Second, by

recognizing that the legislature has a legitimate role in determining what the tort law of
the state should be, and that it may expand and contract tort rights as appropriate for

larger public purposes, this approach would undoubtedly mute much of the criticism that
Berry has arrogated to the court complete control over the contraction of tort rights. (See
Attorney General's Amicus Brief at pp. 15-22.)

Finally, because Masich assumes, but does not hold, that article 1. section 11
imposes a substantive limitation on the legislature's ability to abolish tort rights,

following it would preserve this court's power to review closely statutory schemes that
do not balance benefits and detriments, but only abolish common law tort rights. See
Masich. 191 P.2dat624.

4lJ In Parks, 2002 UT 55 at ^j 20-2 1, a unanimous court rejected a challenge to the same
substitute remedy, based on Lyon.

"• It seems noteworthy that the court's decisions based on other constitutional provisions
that can produce a heightened scrutiny review- of legislation have not been the subject of
this harsh criticism, much less calls to overturn them. This may be because the triggering
thresholds for heightened scrutiny under those other constitutional provisions are not as
low as Berry's, nor do thev reach so broadly.
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In the present case, the Masich approach to the first prong of the Berry analysis
should lead the court to conclude that the Act, of which the S250,000 (now $400,000) cap

on non-economic damages is a part, satisfies article I, section 1l.L" The Act balances the
interests of the public in available and affordable insured health care against their right to
sue health care providers for malpractice without limitation. These interests are balanced
because the legislature made the reasonable judgment, as supported by empirical
evidence, that there is a direct relationship between tort rights and affordable, available
insured health care. See supra at pp. 4-10.

The Act's primary purpose is to assure the continued availability of affordable,
insured health care. To that end, the Act gives the insurance commissioner authority to
invoke a risk pool of all insurers to assure that medical liability coverage is available to
those who provide health care to the public, a public which includes an individual who
may become a victim of malpractice. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-9. This is one benefit
given the class of customers of health care providers in exchange for the detriments
imposed on the members of that class who are individual malpractice plaintiffs. This also

means that an individual malpractice victim benefits from the Act because he or she gains
access to affordable care from an insured doctor, as opposed to an uninsured one.
Moreover, the plaintiff is assured of keeping a larger portion of any award than
previously might have been the case because the Act limits contingent fees to one-third of
any recovery. See id. at § 78-14-7.5.

" The United States Supreme Court, faced with a similar analytical challenge, has
followed the course set by Masich and Justice Howe in Lyon. As the United State
Supreme Court observed in upholding the provisions of the Price-Anderson Act, which
placed a dollar Emit on total liability that would be incurred by a defendant in the event
of a nuclear accident, "[i]t should be emphasized . . . that it is collecting a judgment, not

filing a lawsuit, that counts. . . . [AJ defendant with theoretically 'unlimited' liability may
be unable to pay a judgment once obtained." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study
Group, 438 U.S. 59, 89-90 (1978).
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While defendant does not suggest that any one provision of the Act. including the
ceiling on non-economic damages, is essential to the survival of the health care or
medical malpractice liability systems, there is nothing in the open courts clause which
prevents the legislature from making a number of statutory changes that, in combination,
provide the requisite benefits to a class of persons to justify its enactment. The fact that

one of the provisions of a large legislative package may in some way impinge upon a tort
cause of action or remedy should not be a reason to separate it from the entire package
and subject it to heightened scrutiny under article 1, section 11. It is enough that this
court can review the package as a whole under the first prong of Berry and, if it is
satisfied the trade-off is not unreasonable, leave the "wisdom or lack of wisdom [of the
balance struck by the act] for the legislature to determine." Masich. 191 P.2d at 625.
Utah's ceiling on non-economic damages operates within an Act that should be

held to satisfy the first prong of Berry.
B.

The Statutory Ceiling on Non-Economic Damages Eliminates a
Social and Economic Evil in a Reasonable Manner.

Even if the cap on non-economic damages, analyzed in light of the entire Act.
docs not satisfy the first prong of the Berry test, the damage cap satisfies the analysis
required by the second prong of Berry because the non-economic damage ceiling
"eliminates clear social and economic evils in a reasonable and nonarbitrary manner."
Craftsman. 1999 UT 18 at «j 17.

Facing the social and economic problems resulting from the increased costs of
medical malpractice insurance, the legislature enacted the non-economic damage ceiling
as one reasonable means of keeping medical malpractice rates within the reach of more
health care providers. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-2. Plaintiff has the burden of

refuting the legislative findings that the ceiling on non-economic damages eliminates
social and economic evils in a reasonable wav. See Craftsman, 1999 UT 18 at T 2 1
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(plaintiff did not produce any "evidence to suggest that the possibility of injury is not
highly remote and unexpected" and contradict the findings of the legislature). See ajso

Parks, 2002 UT 55 at1| 8.43 Plaintiff has not carried that burden.
As discussed in detail above, in enacting the 1976 Health Care Malpractice Act,

the legislature specifically found that "the number of suits and claims for damages and
the amount ofjudgments and settlements arising from health care . . . [had] substantially
increased the cost of medical malpractice insurance." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2. This
resulted in increased costs for patients and discouraged health care providers from

continuing to "provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of
malpractice insurance." See id, The purpose of the Act was to enact provisions
"designed to encourage private insurance companies to provide health-related
malpractice insurance .... [and to establish] a mechanism to ensure the availability of
insurance in the event that it bcc[a]me unavailable from private companies." See id.

When medical malpractice rates again began to rise dramatically in the early
1980's, the legislature added provisions, including a cap on non-economic damages. At
the time, non-economic damage caps were seen as efficacious in keeping malpractice
rates from rising too fast. (See Health Care Amicus Brief at pp. 23-26.)
Plaintiff seeks to discredit these 1986 legislative findings in support of the cap's

enactment by reference to Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572 (Utah 1993), which invalidated
under article T, section 24 the Act's statute of repose for children asserting medical

malpractice claims. (See App. Br. at 20-24.) In Lee, the majority opinion questioned

43 While former Justice Zimmerman stated in several cases, including Condemarin, that
the burden did, de facto, shift to the legislature to justify a statute that limited tort rights,
and Berry and Lee appear to have adopted such an approach, sub silentio, no majority
opinion ever accepted this argument. Sec 775 P.2d at 368 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in
part) (citations omitted). As detailed in the text, the court in Craftsman and Parks appear
to reject this argument and Justice Zimmerman himself later retreated from this position.
See Craftsman, 1999 UT 18 at ^j 108-55 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result)).

whether the information available to the legislature when it enacted the statute of repose
for minors justified a measure so draconian that it "terminates minors' rights to sue in
eases in which there has been no reasonable opportunity to file a claim." Lcc. 867 P.2d at
580. However, the information reviewed by the Lee court was confined to what was
before the legislature in 1976 when it first passed the Act, including the statute of repose
for minors, not the information that was before the legislature when it enacted the noneconomic damage ceiling in 19867"
Furthermore, a review of the history of Utah's medical malpractice insurance rates

since the passing of the statutory ceiling on non-economic damages shows that Utah
legislature was correct in its prcdicth e judgment in 1986. The non-economic cap has
successfully kept medical malpractice rates relatively stable. (Sec Health Care Amicus

Brief at pp. 25-26.) This is precisely why the legislature should be given leeway to
modify the common law to meet modem circumstances. It definitionally acts in a
prospective way, and to that end is entitled to make judgments about the future impact of

legislation. Here, the empirical evidence bears out the wisdom of the legislature's choice.
Xot only has the ceiling on non-economic damages proven to be effective, but it is
a reasonable and non-arbitrary mechanism to achieve the legislature's desired ends. First,
it is reasonable in amount. The ceiling is currently at $400,000 and is adjusted annually
for inflation. See Utah Code Ann, § 78-14-7.1. This is a far more reasonable mechanism

"4 Moreover, giving all due deference to the court's views in Lee about the proper weight
to be given legislative findings supporting the Act, those remarks were unnecessary to the
decision. Incidental statements or conclusions not necessary to the decision are not to be

regarded as authority, especially in later cases involving different statutes and legislative
findings. It was enough under the Utah Constitution that, in contrast to this case where
the cap has an equal application to all age groups, the challenged statute in Lcc adversely
affected and was directed at "the rights of children." Lee, 867 P.2d at 583. In that regard,
the constitutional law of this state has long mirrored that of the United States Supreme
Court which applies a stricter standard of scrutiny to equal protection cases involving

children's rights. See id. (citing to Plvier v. Doe' 457 U.S. 202, 223-24 (1982)).
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than the ceilings on total damages previously upheld by this court. See, e.g.. Parks, 2002

UT 55 atfl 14, 18 (upholding as constitutional total ceiling of $250,000 on both special
(economic) and general (non-economic) damages as applied to judgments against

government entities); Lyon, 2000 UT 19 (upholding as constitutional total damage ceiling
of $250,000 for judgment arising from firefighting activities); Bott, 922 P.2d at 743
(noting that total damage cap of S250,000 was constitutional as applied to judgments for
injuries resulting from performance of governmental functions); McCorvey, 868 P.2d at

48 (holding total damage ceiling of $250,000 constitutional for injuries arising out of
negligence in performing governmental functions). But see Condemarin, 775 P.2d at
357-58 (per Durham, J.) (striking down on constitutional grounds the $100,000 damage

ceiling on both special and general damages recoverable against an uninsured
government entity for negligently inflicted injury or death).

Second, the damage ceiling only limits "soft" damages for pain and suffering, as
opposed to "hard" out-of-pocket damages, and it imposes no limit on punitive damages.
This court has recognized that hard and soft damages are analytically distinct. In

Condemarin, now-Chief Justice Durham cited the relatively higher importance placed on
hard damages as a basis for her opinion that the $ 100,000 cap on total damages was
unconstitutional.. She found the cap "absurdly low" in part because the amount
recoverable was unlikely to cover "even the medical expenses of plaintiff." 775 P.2d at
365-66. Another justice said, in a separate opinion in Condemarin, that "|w]hen the

people are deprived of a right to recover actual out-of-pocket expenditures . . . the

infringement upon the right to recover for harm to the person is far more severe and

requires far more justification than when general damages for pain and suffering or
punitive damages are restricted." Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 369 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in part).
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This distinction between hard and soft damages has also been important to the

court in evaluating the sustainability of punitive damage awards. Soft damages have
historically been less likely to support a high multiple of punitive damages to actual
damages. Sec Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 P.2d 789, 811 n, 29 (Utah

1991). And in choosing to adopt a narrow "zone of danger" rule for defining the
availability of a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the court
was plainh' guided by concern regarding the ability of the judicial system to determine
the existence and value of non-economic harms which arc not accompanied by objective

evidence of injury. See Johnson v. Rogers. 763 P.2d 771, 784-85 (Utah 1988).
The legislature obviously agreed with this court's view about the lesser weight to
be given non-economic damages in any scheme of "full recovery" when it enacted the

medical malpractice cap and later barred recovery of punitive damages against
pharmaceutical companies in compliance with federal standards. See Utah Code Ann. §
78-18-2.'5

in viewing non-economic damages with some skepticism, this court and the

legislature are in good company. Forty years ago, California Supreme Court Justice
Roger Traynor, widely recognized as the father of the doctrine of strict liability for
product defects, warned of the need to limit non-economic damages to assure that more
persons can receive full recovery for their economic losses:
There has been forceful criticism of the rationale for awarding

damages for pain and suffering in negligence cases. Such
damages originated under primitive law as a means of
punishing wrongdoers and assuaging the feelings of those

4"' The similarity, indeed overlap, between punitive and pain and suffering damages has
been long recognized. "[TJhe development of damages for pain and suffering calls to
mind that the origins of damages at common law for personal injury stem not so much
from an interest in compensating injured persons for actual loss as buying off the anger of
the victim's family and forestalling vengeful retaliation." O'Connell & Simon. Payment
For Pain and Suffering: Who Wants What, When & Why 108 (1972).

who had been wronged.
They become increasingly
anomalous as emphasis shifts in a mechanized society from
ad hoc punishment to orderly distribution of losses through
insurance and the price of goods or of transportation.
Ultimately such losses are borne by a public free of fault as
part of the price for the benefits of mechanization.
Nonetheless, this state has long recognized pain and suffering
as elements of damages in negligence cases; any change in

this regard must await reexamination of the problem by the
Legislature.
Seffert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 364 P.2d 337. 345 (Cal. 1961).

The California Legislature responded to Traynor's suggestion in 1975 by capping
non-economic damages recoverable in medical malpractice actions at $250,000. The
California Supreme Court upheld that statute against a challenge on state and federal
constitutional grounds, and cited Justice Traynor's Seffert opinion in support of its
decision:

Thoughtful jurists and legal scholars have for some time
raised serious questions as to the wisdom of awarding
damages for pain and suffering in any negligence ease,
noting, inter alia, the inherent difficulties in placing a
monetary value on such losses, the fact that money damages
are at best only imperfect compensation for such intangible
injuries and that such damages are generally passed on to, and
borne by, innocent consumers.

Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137. 159 (Cal. 1985).
Appellant does not address this well-recognized legal distinction between
economic and non-economic damages other than to assert that under the common law of
Utah, both are essential for full recovery. (See App. Br. at 28, 35-36.) But he cites no

Utah case authority in support of this proposition, only authority from Illinois, 'fexas and
New York. (See id. at 16-17, 25-36.) The absence of Utah authority is important, since
contrary to appellant's assertion, the people of Utah did not adopt the common law of
F.ngland until two years after statehood. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-2-1. It is not accorded
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some sacred spot in the Utah pantheon of legal sources. Even in 1898, the common law
was adopted only "so far as it was not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the . . . laws of
this state . . . ." kL § 68-3-2. And Utah law expressly states that statutes in derogation of

the common law are to be interpreted liberally, at the expense of the common law. Sec
Id. The Act's cap on non-economic damages states the law and public policy in Utah.
The ceiling on non-economic damages satisfies the second prong of the Berry test
because it has helped eliminate a clear social and economic evil, and has done so in a way
that was not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of achieving that objective.
IV.

THE STATUTORY CEILING ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE LAWS PROVISION OF THE

UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 24.

In a comparable vein to the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the
United States Constitution, article I. section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: "All

laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The basic concept behind Utah's
uniform operation of the law- provision is to restrain the legislature from the
"fundamentally unfair practice of creating classifications that result in different treatment

being given persons who are, in tact, similarly situated . . . ." Mountain Fuel Supply, 752
P.2d at 888.

The test under article I, section 24 is "whether the classification of those subject to

the legislation is a reasonable one and bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement

of a legitimate legislative purpose." Id. at 890 (citing Malan v. Lewis. 693 P.2d 661, 670
(Utah 1988)]. Although the analytical model of the uniform operation of the courts

provision is different than the open courts provision, in substance it operates in much the
same way. See, e.g., Lee, 867 P.2d at 582-83, 590-91 (majority applies uniform

operation of the courts provision while concurring opinion reaches the same result under
the open courts provision); Condemarin. 775 P.2d 352-74 (per Durham. J., Zimmerman,

J. and Stewart, J.) (applying various constitutional provisions to reach the same result
including open courts, uniform operation of law, due process, and right to jury trial).
Like the open courts provision, the uniform operation of the courts provision has two
distinct analytical approaches: a heightened scrutiny of legislative action and one that is
more deferential to legislative enactments. See Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 88889.

Plaintiff contends that the statutory cap on non-economic damages in medical

malpractice actions violates the Utah Constitution's uniform operation of the laws
provision because the cap is not based on a reasonable classification nor is it reasonably
related to a legitimate legislative purpose. (See App. Br. at 3 1-40.) Plaintiffs argument
is based heavily on his application of the heightened scrutiny standard of review, as
applied in Lee, 867 P.2d at 582-83.

Plaintiffs argument should be rejected. First, the argument for a heightened
standard of scrutiny depends on acceptance of the claim that plaintiffs rights under

article I, section 11 are implicated. (See App. Br. at 35.) But, as discussed at length
above, no fundamental rights of plaintiff under the open courts provision are violated by
the non-economic damage ceiling because there is no fundamental right to unlimited non-

economic damages in a medical malpractice action. See supra at pp. 27-33.
Second, regardless of the level of analysis., the classifications plaintiff identifies
are not discriminatory classifications of persons of a same class or invalid classifications
of persons of different classes. See Malan 693 P.2d at 669 (noting that a law must applyequally to persons of the same class and is not invalid as it applies to persons of different
classes if it is "based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the

objectives of the statute"). The fact that a statute treats people differently does not mean
that the discrimination is impermissible. All legislative classifications are either under-
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inclusive or over-inclusive, ""fhe legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose special

burdens upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes of individuals.'""'1 That
does not make the legislative classification arbitrary and unreasonable. "[T]he state is not
bound to deal alike with all . , . classes, or to strike at all evils at the same time or in the

same way." Scmler v. Dental Examiners. 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935).

Plaintiff points to three specific ways in which the ceiling on non-economic
damages classifies potential plaintiffs so as to discriminate between those with hard

damages and those with soft damages. First, plaintiff claims that the statute discriminates
betw-een victims of medical malpractice and other tort victims. (See App. Br. at 32.) The

first group has their soft damages capped; the second does not. The response is that there
are legitimate differences between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims that
the legislature could rely upon in classifying them differently for the purpose of capping
soft damages. As noted above, high and unpredictable exposure to soft damages awards
in the medical malpractice area is one significant factor that is driving up insurance rates

and making insurance difficult to obtain, it also feeds directly into the affordability crisis
in medicine. Caps on soft damages have been found to be one of the few measures that
effectively slow the growth of costs and make awards more predictable. Therefore, the
differences between the medical malpractice area and tort law in general is sufficiently

great that itjustifies different treatment for one class of plaintiffs versus the other. (See
Health Care Amicus Brief at pp. 12-16.)

Further, in order to make this argument, plaintiffsets up a straw-man distinction
between medical malpractice victims and other tort victims. In considering the

application of uniform operation of the laws, this is not the relevant distinction. As the
dissent in Laney argued, in a slightly different context, because prospectively each of us
40 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 38 Calif. L. Rev. 341. 343
(1949).
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is a potential victim of medical malpractice, "[n]o group is singled out by legislation that
limits the ability to recover" for medical malpractice. 2002 UT 79 at *i 98 (VVilkins, J.,
concurring and dissenting). Accordingly, the cap does not create classifications that
result in different treatment being given persons who are, in fact, similarly situated . . . ."
Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 888.

Second, plaintiff claims that the cap discriminates between medical malpractice
victims with primarily economic injuries, on the one hand, and those with primarily noneconomic injuries, on the other. (See App. Br. at 32-33.) As discussed above, for several
reasons independent of the medical malpractice context, the law views differently a

plaintiffs rights to recover economic and non-economic losses. The law often treats soft
and hard damages differently because it is often difficult to determine the existence of
soft damages, and because once their existence is determined, they arc hard to measure in
dollars. Neither is true of hard damages. As a consequence, the law is more wary of soft

damages. Sec supra at pp. 30-33. If the courts and legislature may make this distinction
in other areas of the law, it is hard to see how- it can be unconstitutionally discriminatory

in an area where there is empirical evidence that the very unpredictability of soft damage
awards is the source of much of the pressure on medical malpractice insurance rates and
the very availability of insurance.

Third, plaintiff claims that the statute discriminates against the most severely
injured because there is a general correlation between the non-economic harm and
economic losses. (See App. Br. at 33.) Plaintiff, however, offers no empirical evidence
of any such correlation between the severity of the injury and high damages for pain and

suffering. All that is offered is bald assertion, which is an insufficient basis for an
argument, much less a holding of unconstitutionality. It takes very little creativity to
conceive of numerous scenarios in which plaintiff's assertion would not be the case. The
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unpredictability of jury verdicts and the inherent difficultly in ascertaining soft damages,
the ineffability of measuring them in dollars, and their subjectivity, makes any correlation
speculative at best.

Plaintiffs argument also should be rejected because the damage cap is reasonably

related to the legitimate purpose of keeping medical malpractice rates within the reach of
more health care providers. Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 887. Plaintiff argues that
even if the classifications made by the legislature are permissible, the means it has

chosen—caps on soft damages—is not reasonably related to the objective of the
legislation, which is to maintain the availability of medical malpractice insurance and
keep it affordable. Plaintiffattempts to rely on this court's decision in Lcc. which

skeptically approached the legislature's attempt to curb the growth in malpractice
premiums by imposing a very short statute of limitations on minors, 'fhe Lcc court
concluded that there was little evidence before the legislature that would justify the
conclusion that the measure would have the result intended.

First, as discussed in detail above. Lee is distinguishable because it effectively

made it impossible for a minor to bring a claim. See supra at pp. 28-29. Second, in Lee
the court concltided that the insurance market was national and that the legislature had no
basis to think that what it did in Utah would affect the national insurance market. See

Lee, S67 P.2d at 584-588. Here, the legislature made the judgment, supported by

empirical evidence, that the insurance market for medical malpractice insurance is local.
See supra at pp. 4-10. It also made the judgment that statutory ceilings on non-economic
damages effectively contain the growth in insurance premiums and maintain the

availability of insurance. See |d. That judgment was based on sound evidence of the

type a legislature is entitled to rely upon in passing forward-looking legislation. See, ea^.
Craftsman. 1999 UT 18 at * 23.

Third, in Lee the court found that the empirical results of the legislature's action
did not show that the measure was an effective way to achieve its ends. Here, the post-

enactment evidence gathered in the Health Care Amicus Brief shows that the legislature's
pre-enactment determination was correct. Caps on soft damages have kept down the
growth in unpredictable awards, have kept the rate of the increase in insurance premiums
down, and have maintained the availability of insurance for health care providers.

Indeed, the evidence is that caps on damages are one of the few measures that are
effective. See supra at pp. 8-10.

Finally, this court's approach in Lee, like that in Berry, of harshly scrutinizing and
second-guessing the legislature's empirical evidence and the wisdom of its judgment, has
not been much in evidence in the more recent cases challenging similar statutes. See

Craftsman, 1999 UT I8 at ]\ 23 (the majority looked only at legislative objectives and
required the party challenging the statute to submit evidence that the objectives were not
met). See also Hjrpa, 948 P.2d at 793-94: Parks, 2002 UT 55 at 1| 8.
Lastly, Plaintiff contends that even if a heightened standard of the reasonable

relation test is not required, the ceiling on non-economic damages is still unconstitutional.
(Sec App. Br. at 38.) As demonstrated above, there is a very close relationship between
the means used and the end sought, and the means are narrowly tailored to the end.
Under such circumstances, even a heightened standard of reasonable relation is satisfied;
axiomatic-ally, a less severe test will also be met. The "rational basis" standard applicable

under article I, section 24 is very deferential to the legislature. "[I|f any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at

the time law was enacted must be assumed." Mountain Fuel Supply, 752 P.2d at 384.

The court should reject the plaintiffs challenge to the cap under the uniform
operation of the laws provision.

:i,?44:.:n
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V.

THL STATUTORY (TILING ON NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS DOES NOT \ IOLATE HIE

HIGH I TO A Jim TRIAL PROVISION OF THE L'TAH
CONSTITUTION. ARTICLE I. SEC HON 10.

Art. I. section 10 of the I. tah Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in

civil cases.4 This right is analogous to that secured by the Seventh Amendment of the
federal constitution.

Plaintiff argues that the right to a jury trial is a fundamental right that has been
violated bv the statutory ceiling on non-economic damages because it operates by

"arbitrarily modifying a jury's damage award" and therefore "infringes the constitutional

right to a jurv trial." (App. Br. at 45.) Plaintiff appears to argue that the jury trial right is
a rieht to have damages, including non-economic damages, determined exclusively bv
the jurv without anv oversight by a court, other than the possibilitv of a remittitur coupled

with an opportunity for a new trial. (See kL at 42-43.) To plaintiff, the right is

apparently absolute. (See [d. at 41-42.) Plaintiffs argument is without support in Utah
law.

The only Utah authority cited by plaintiff in support of his position that his right to
a jurv trial has been violated is Justice Durham's separate opinion in Condemarin. 775

P.2d at 365-Ob (per Durham. J.). That opinion cites a violation of article I. section U as
one of the alternative grounds upon which that justice would have struck down the
S100.000 cap on total damages applicable to the I'mversity of I 'tah Ilospital. See id. No

other justice joined in that part of the opinion. Interestingly, plaintiff asserts, as logic
seems to require, that the right of the jury to determine damages without interference by
" Article 1. section 10 states in relevant part that "the Legislature shall establish the

number ofjurors [in civil cases] by statute, but m no event shall a jury consist of no fewer
than eight persons" and that "three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict."
":" The Seventh Amendment states: "In suits at common law, where the value in

controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial byjury shall be preserved, and
no fact tried bv a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the l. nited States.
than according to the rules of common law." I hS. Const, amend VII.

39

the court is absolute, and a cap of any type on a jury's verdict would offend the
constitution. (Sec App. Br. at 41-42.) Justice Durham's opinion, however, does not take
this logical absolutist approach. Rather, it applies what amounts to a heightened scrutiny
standard to find that the cap was invalid because it limited total damages recoverable to
Si00,000, an "absurdly low" amount unlikely to cover "even the medical expenses of

plaintiff" and to further find that there was a lack of "any evidence" justifying the
ceiling. On this basis. Justice Durham was led to "strike the balance" in favor o\' finding
an infringement of the right to jury trial. Condemarin, 775 P.2d at 366 (per Durham, J.).
Even if the court were to accept Justice Durham's case-specific dicta in
('ondemarin and apply this balancing analysis to the cap on non-economic damages, the
balance should be struck in favor of the statute's validity. The limit challenged here is

significantly higher than that in Condemarin, and it applies only to soft damages. In
addition, as of last year, the limit on soft damages has been raised to $400,000. four times
the absolute cap on all damages in Condemarin. Moreover, unlike the limit in
('ondemarin. ample justification for this narrow prescription is offered. Under Justice
Durham's lest in Condemarin, the present statute would be upheld.
But the law in Utah on the application of article I, section 10 is not Justice
Durham's Condemarin opinion.

Rather, it is set forth in two later rulings by the Utah

Supreme Court in which a majority rejected challenges to caps under this provision.
Neither case is cited by appellant. In McCorvey v. \ halt State Department of
fransportation. this court held that a S250.0O0 cap on total damages against the state did
not violate article I, section 10. See 80S P.2d at 47-48. In Parks v. I hah Transit

'fhe sole authority cited by Justice Durham was a federal district court opinion in Boyd
viBukliu 672 F. Supp. 915 (W.D. Va. 1987). See 775 P.2d at 365-66. Bulala has long
since been reversed by the Fourth Circuit, which holds that the right to jury trial is not
violated by that state's cap because "it is not the role of the jury to determine the legal
consequences of its factual findings
That is a matter for the legislature." Boyd v.
Mala, 877 F.2d I 191, 1196 (4th Cir. 19S9).

40

Authority, the court summarily rejected the same claim when made against another total
damages cap. See 2002 UT 55 at *j IS. While both cases were decided in the
governmental immunity context, there is no analytical distinction between a
governmental immunity case as contrasted to a private party case when it comes to the

relative roles of the jury and the legislature as respects the constitutionality of a cap on
damages. The right is either to have the jury set damages in their entirety, or it is not.
And the McCorvey and Parks cases have firmly held that the jury trial right does not

impair the legislature's ability to cap damages.
Other jurisdictions have likewise rejected appellant's argument. In Etheridge v.
Medical Ctr. Hosps.. the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a statutory cap did not

violate the right to jury trial because the role of the jury was limited to ascertaining facts
and assessing damages. Sec 376 S.F.2d 525. 529 (Va. 1989). The court reasoned that
statutory caps merely established the outer limits of a remedy and that this determination
was a matter of law. Since the trial court imposed the cap only after the jury had fulfilled

its fact-finding function, as is the procedure in Utah, there was no interference with the
right to trial by jury. See id. at 529. The Indiana Supreme Court reached a similar
conclusion for similar reasons. See Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hospital Inc., 404 N.E.2d
585,592-93 (Ind. 1980).

Finally, the United States Supreme Court in Cooper Industries. Inc. v. Leatherman
'fool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437 (200U. held that the determination by a reviewing

court of the lawfulness of a jury determination of an award of punitive damages is not a
review by the court of a determination o( fact by the jury, but a question of law.

Consequently, for an appellate court to determine that an award exceeds the lawful limit
and to order an award reduced does not offend the federal constitutional right to a jury
trial. See id. at 437-39. Analogous reasoning would result in holdinc that the Utah

Constitution is likewise not offended by a court reducing a damage award because it
exceeds an amount that the legislature has determined is unlawful.
In sum, the right to trial by jury is not violated by the cap.
VI.

THE COURT SHOULD DISREGARD PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS ARGUMENTS AS THEY WERE
NOT PRESERVED BELOW.

Plaintiffs brief raises for the first time two additional substantive arguments.

Plaintiff asserts that the statutory ceiling on non-economic damages in medical

malpractice cases violates the Utah Constitution's due process provision, article I, section
7, because it restricts appellant's right to recover full damages, and the Utah

Constitution's separation of powers provision, article V, section 1, because the legislature
exercised judicial power by enacting the statute. Because these claims were not
preserved below, this court should reject them out of hand.
This court adheres to a "longstanding rule that [itj will not consider issues raised

for the first time on appeal," including constitutional issues. Julian v. State, 966 P.2d
249, 258 (Utah 1998); sec also Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996). To

preserve issues for appeal, parties must raise them in a manner in which the "trial court
[is] offered an opportunity to rule on [the] issue." Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966
P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998). "A trial court has the opportunity to rule if the following
three requirements are met: (I) The issue must be raised in a timely fashion;' (2) The
issue must be specifically raised;' and (3) a party must introduce 'supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority."1 kL (citation omitted). Plaintiff satisfied none of these
conditions.

Plaintiff did not raise either the due process or the separation-of-powers arguments

properly before the trial court. Neither point was briefed. (See R. 447-74.) Plaintiffs
counsel did allude to these points at oral argument, but only in rebuttal, and the trial court
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did not have before it "supporting evidence or relevant legal authoritv" on these two legal
theories. [Sec R. 810 at pp. 44-45.) Plaintiffs counsel admitted as much to the trial
judge. (Sec id.)

Plaintiff had ample opportunity to raise these constitutional claims before the trial
court and failed to do so. This court should decline to consider these arguments."''

A.

Even if the Argument Had Been Preserved, the Statutory Ceiling
on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions
Does Not Violate the Due Process Provision of the Utah
Constitution. Article I, Section 7.

Plaintiffs first improperly preserved argument is that the cap violates the due

process clause, article I. section A That section reads: "No person shall be deprived ol
life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Plaintiff maintains that the right to
recover full damages for personal injuries is a substantive right protected by I tali's due
process clause and that this right is violated by the statutory ceiling on non-economic
damages in medical malpractice cases. (App. Br. at 28.)

This court has recogm/ed that under the I tah Constitution, a substantive "due

process question can . . . arise when a statute provides that a particular right is
automatically lost or impaired in a specific circumstance . . . ." Wcljs v. ( hildren_s_\id
Society of Utah. 681 P.2d 199. 2<>5-06 (Utah 1984). If the court determines that the right

impinged upon is a fundamental right, a heightened scrutiny standard applies, requiring
the proponents of the statute to show "(1) a compelling state interest in the result to be
achieved and (2) that the means adopted are -narrowly tailored to achieve the basic

..tatutorv purpose.'" jch at 206 (internal citation omitted) (finding that parental rights arc
fundamental). On the other hand, if the statute does not infringe upon a fundamental

right, it will be upheld if it "bears a rational relationship to an end of government not
""' The only exceptions to the preservation requirement are plain error and manifest
injustice, neither ofwhich are applicable here. Sec State v. Lope/. S86 P.2d 1HL\ 1113
(L'tah 1994).

prohibited by the constitution." M(_nintajnJ;uel_SimpJy.,Co., 752 P.2d at 888-90 (noting
that the federal due process clause and equal protection clauses are treated as requiring
the same review and upholding the license tax under rational basis test); see also Wells.
6S3 P.2d at 204-05 (describing two levels of scrutiny, with rational basis applying to
economic regulations).

Plaintiffs initial argument under article I, section 7 is that the court should employ
a ••compelling

state interest" test to determine the constitutionality of the cap on non-

economic damages. This position rests upon the same assumption that underlies

plaintiffs call for strict scrutiny tinder article I, section 10 and article L section 24

that

there exists some fundamental right to recover lull damages for personal injuries, and that
"lull damages" includes unlimited non-economic damages. (S_e_e App. Br. at 28.)
As noted earlier, no appellate opinion of this state holds that one has a

constitutional right to a particular measure of damages. See supra at pp. 30-33. If there
is no constitutional right to any specific measure of damages, it is hard to understand how
a court could conclude that one is constitutionally entitled to all tiie non-economic

damages a jury might choose to award, given their inherently subjective and speculative
nature, and the fact that the law has traditionally viewed them with some suspicion. It

might be one thing to say that a person has a constitutional right to be fully compensated
lor economic losses which are objectively measurable and verifiable

something that (his

court has never acid. But it is quite another to hold that something as amorphous,
immeasurable, and unverifiable as unlimited amounts of damages for "pain and
sutlcring" rises to the level of "an important substantive right" for which the Utah
Constitution must extend heightened protection.

Because there is no fundamental right to unlimited non-economic damages, this
court should apply the rational basis test and izraut deference to the legislature's
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constitutional role to determine public policy."'1 Ifsuch a test is applied, there is little
doubt that the cap on non-economic damages for medical malpractice would withstand
scrutiny. For this test is "so tolerant that the substantive content of economic statutes

rarely vlolates due process." Weds. 681 P.2d at 2()5.
But even if the court were to conclude that the compelling state interest test were

the appropriate standard, the cap should still withstand scrutiny. As pointed out above in
connection with the open courts discussion, the statute is fully capable of withstanding

both prongs of the Berry analysis. And that analysis is as strict as a compelling state
interest analysis under the Utah due process clause and not significantly different in what
it weighs. Sec Craftsman. 1999 IT 18 at rr41 -4" (StewartJ., concurring): see also
Wells. 6S1 P.2d at 207 (upholding statute that terminated parental rights under the strict
scrutiny test).

B.

Even if the Argument Had Been Preserved, the Statutory Ceiling
on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions
Docs Not Violate the Separation of Powers Provision of the Utah
Constitution, Article V, Section 1.

The second argument that plaintiff did not properly preserve below is that the cap
violates the separation of powers provision, article V. section I of the L'tah Constitution.
That pan ision reads as follow s:

The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be
divided into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the
Executive, and the Judicial; and no person charged with the

exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these
departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
cither of the others, except m the cases herein expressly
directed or permitted.

"'Appellant relies on Condemarin as a ruling based on due process. As noted in Par_ks,
Condemarin has "limited precedential value" and stands for little more than that three
judges found the statute there challenged to be unconstitutional. 2002 UT 55 at *11.
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Plaintiff contends that "by fixing the amount of non-economic damages a plaintiff may

recover in medical malpractice cases, the legislature has exercised judicial power in
violation of article V, section 1 of the L4ah Constitution ,0~ (App. Br. at 49.)
Plaintiffs argument turns the separation of powers doctrine on its head, and if
accepted, would deprive the legislature of the power to determine what the substantive
law of L'tah should be in the future. See Ryan v. Cold Cross Serv.. Inc.. 903 P.2d 423.

425 (Utah 1995). This court has recognized the fundamental precept that "[t]he power to
declare what the law shall be is legislative. The power to declare what is the law is
judicial." See RhciiLe__y,i<ichar(ls. 47 P. 670, 675 (Utah 1896) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff would subvert this division of powers by prohibiting the legislature from
enacting limitations on non-economic damages if unrestricted damages w-ere the rule at
common law at some undefined point in time.
This court has long acknowledged that it is for the legislature to decide what the
law should be, and that the common law operates only interstitially until the legislature
acts. Justice Wolfe wrote in Masich that "|n|aturally most departures from the common
law, especially if marked, will be made by the legislature, but judicial legislation (and

such it is regard ess of what jurisprudential terminology maybe employed) fills the

interstices in a more gradual process." Masich v. 1:nited States Smelting, Refining A
Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612, 626 (Utah 1948) (Wolfe, J., concurring). This view of the
common law as subordinate to the legislature is, at core, the plain meaning of section 683-2 of the Code:

The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the
statutes of this state.

The statutes establish the laws of this

state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally

" This argument is a variation of the right to a jury trial argument and should be rejected
on the same grounds. See surmi at pp. 39-42.
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construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and
to promote justice.

This provision was adopted in 189^ at the same time as section 68-3-1. the provision
adopting the common law of England as the law o\' Utah. It was passed by a legislature
that included many of those who drafted the I hah Constitution, and expresses as clear as
words can that the statutes are to be supreme, not the common law.

\o provision of the Utah Constitution perpetuates common law causes of action in
the face of conflicting statutes, or a future entitlement to certain measures of damage." It
is true that vested rights to common law causes of action are protected against retroactive
legislation. Sec Richards Irrigation Co. v. Karren. 880 P.2d 6. 9-10 (Utah App. 1994).
But to protect an abstract right that has not yet vested in an individual against alteration

or deletion by the legislature is contrary to section 6S-32-2 and to the entire history of the
relations between the judicial and legislative branches of government in Utah.
Defendant contends that the cap on non-economic damages can be upheld without

addressing the challenge to the lcgitimacv of the role that Berry has given this court \ isa-v is the legislature. If, hovvev er. the court chooses to address the separation of powers

point, despite the fact that it was not raised properly below, defendant takes the position
set out in the Attorney General's amicus brief: To the extent Berry can be said to endorse
the position of plaintiff that the common law is exalted over the legislative and that any

single provision limiting tort rights that is part of a larger remedial legislative scheme is
to be analyzed under a heightened scrutiny standard, it should be overruled. See State ot

-•; In this sense. Utah is consistent with other states. See. ea^. Wheeler v. Bnggs. 941

SAY.2d 512. 514 (Mo. 1997) ("legislature has the right to modify the substantive law to
eliminate or restrict causes of action"); Mayo v. Rousclle Corp.. 375 So.2d 449 (Ala.

1979) (the right to bring an action can be modified, limited or repealed as the legislature
sees fit. except where such cause of action has already accrued); (ioldstein v. Hertz
Corp.. 305 N.L.2d 617. 626 (111. App. 19"3) ("While the Constitution provides that every
person shall find a remedy for all injuries received, the power and adequacy of the
available remedy rests with the Legislature")

Utah Amicus Brief at pp. 15-22. Recently, Justice Wilkins, joined by Associate Chief
Justice Durrant, made much the same argument for overruling Berry in Lanev v. Lairview
City, 2002 1"Y 79 at V, 89-93 (Wilkins, J., concurring and dissenting, joined by Durrant.
A.C.J.). 'fhe time has come to return the relationship of the common law to statute law,
and of this court to the legislature, to that assigned by the drafters of the Utah
Constitution.

'fhe legislature's decision to limit the amount of non-economic damages

recoverable against a health care provider for professional negligence does not offend the
separation of powers provision of the Utah Constitution
CONCLUSION

A heightened standard of scrutiny should not be applied to Utah's statutory cap on
non-economic damages in medical malpractice actions. Viewing the cap in the broader
context of the entire Health Care Malpractice Act, which was designed to assure that

medical services are readily available to the public and to assure that insurance is

available to heaith care providers, the restriction imposed by the cap on the remedy
available to a plaintiff is mild and more than balanced by the benefits to the class of
which potential plaintiffs are members. Choosing where to strike the balance between

the interests of the public in affordable, insured health care, and the interests of particular
members of that public in not having their tort rights against health care providers
restricted in any manner, is a matter of legislative judgment to w hich this court should
defer.

Even il a heightened standard were to be applied to the cap alone, the current

statute should be upheld as it is narrow in its application and mild in its limit on non-

economic damages, and it permits complete recovery of non-economic and punitive

damages. 1 he legislature had strong empirical justifications to believe that a cap on non-
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economic damages would serve to keep medical malpractice insurance rates in I tah
within reach of more health care prov idcrs. and recent studies on a national arid loca.

level have shown that this tvpe eje,y ac:uall> has had the anticipated effec:.
I his court should find that under either standard of scrulinv. and under anv

constitutional provision raised bv plaintiff, the cap on non-economic damages contained
in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act i< constitutional.
I) \ ITT) this d>0 ja, of August. 2on2.
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